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CONSTITUTIONAL CORPORATISM: THE PUBLIC USE
CLAUSE AS A MEANS OF CORPORATE WELFARE
John Kieran Murphy
I. Introduction
The use of the eminent domain power to provide quintessentially
public goods, such as public roads, toll roads, ferries, canals, railroads,
and public parks is a use of government power which has never been
of much legal controversy.' However, increasingly, the Supreme
Court has laid down precedent which challenges the conventional no-
tions of "public use" and stretched the bounds of legitimate govern-
ment commingling with private enterprise. Those with the most
money and economic clout have the attention of state actors in rede-
velopment projects rather than those whom the state actors are
elected or appointed to represent.2
State and local governments, which are meant to serve and protect
the rights and interests of their respective constituents, are instead
serving and protecting the financial interests of the well-connected.
This contradiction is often explained away by citing the fringe benefits
that will accrue to the community at large by divesting some of its
members of their real property. Rather than accord affluent commer-
cial citizens the same deference and power as all other citizens, locali-
ties are increasingly commingling their interests with those of their
most economically-promising community members (and sometimes
those who are not even members of the community).s
This commingling has a distinctly corporatist character. Corporat-
ism is a means of political organization which seeks, in the name of
efficiency, to implement public policy through cooperation of govern-
ment, corporations, and labor. In an attempt to provide maximal
beneficial results, however, democratic processes are sidestepped.
This is often what takes place in modern redevelopment proceedings;
1. See Kelo v. City of New London, Conn., 545 U.S. 469, 512 (2005) (Thomas,
J., dissenting).
2. Michael L. Wachter, Labor Unions: A Corporatist Institution in a Competitive
World, 155 U. PA. L. REv. 581, 591 (2007).
3. Id.
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state actors and non-state actors take part in decision making without
the approval of the constituency. Contrary to its claimed benefits of
efficiency and proportionate positive outcomes for all, this paper will
show that the costs of corporatism outweigh those benefits, particu-
larly for the functioning of a free and democratic society.'
This Comment will argue that the inequities involved in these gov-
ernmental takings pose equal protection problems and as such, cases
in which the state seeks to enforce its eminent domain power to the
benefit of a private party should be analyzed with strict scrutiny or a
variant of intermediate scrutiny at the least. If it can be proven that
governmental takings are often corporatist in nature and thus dispro-
portionately harm those with limited access to policy decisions, it nec-
essarily follows that strict scrutiny should apply as the government
actions here tend to "prejudice . . . discrete and insular minorities."'
Section II of this paper begins by providing a background of corpo-
ratism, as it offers the closest analogue to the government actions and
ideology underpinning modern Fifth Amendment takings. Subsec-
tion A defines corporatism by analyzing the way in which it is meant to
work in theory and the way it tends to work in reality. Its cooperative
tendency and desire for defined public goals are some of its more
enduring features. Subsection B of Section II critiques the theory. It
shows that despite its grand language and calls to cooperation, both in
practice and in theory, it falls short of a desirable social structure.
Subsection C discusses the judicial analysis of takings and how it has
changed over time leading up to 2005. The seminal cases discussed
will highlight the slow doctrinal evolution that lead to judicial abroga-
tion of the definition of "public use," and its modification to include
"public purpose," "public benefit," and "redevelopment," to name a
few. Subsection D finalizes the analysis with a discussion of the Kelo
majority opinion and its reasoning. Given the import of the decision
on this area of law, the analysis will be rather detailed.
Subsection E discusses several cases that have been decided in the
years following Kelo and attempts to show their overarching themes.
Rather than refine the Kelo holding, these cases have given legislative
bodies and local governments free rein to grant private transfers to
real-estate developers. Section III then provides analysis of the thesis.
Subsection A & B analyze public-private redevelopment projects and
highlights the corporatist nature of the process and the negative ef-
fects such projects have on minority groups, particularly the poor and
black community.
4. Alfred C. Aman, Jr., Globalization, Democracy, and the Need for A New Adminis-
trative Law, 49 UCLA L. REv. 1687, 1705 (2002).
5. United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
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Finally, Subsection C takes a second look at the two dissents from
Kelo v. City of New London.' From these two dissents, this paper at-
tempts to solidify a heightened standard of review for takings given
the detrimental effects they can have on certain groups. This subsec-
tion concludes that the inequities involved in these private transfers
masked as governmental takings pose equal protection problems and
as such, cases in which the state seeks to enforce its eminent domain
power to the benefit of a private party should be analyzed with strict
scrutiny or at least a variant of intermediate scrutiny.
II. Background
A. Corporatism Defined
Corporatism is a school of political thought that conceives
politics as a live organism. Indeed, the term corporatism de-
rives from corpus, the Latin word for body. Similar to the
human body, in the corporatist State there should be a brain
commanding the organs and muscles to better serve the
needs and interests of the body as a whole. In this context,
political leaders (the brain) make sure that society's welfare
prevails over particular interests.'
Corporatism is most often associated with fascism, as corporatism is
the preferred economic structure of classical fascism.' Classical fas-
cism's attack on the liberty of the market and economic individualism
was always to be remedied by corporatism and regulated markets.'
This link to authoritarian government is not coincidental, as corporat-
ism is often meant to serve the interests of a select few, as will be dis-
cussed subsequently.
The corporatist approach posits the existence of a public interest,
which the state determines and tries to further through the use of
government power.' 0 Corporatism argues that corporations and gov-
ernments should cooperate closely to attain these desired social
6. 545 U.S. 469, 494 (2005) (O'Connor, J., dissenting); id. at 505 (Thomas, J.,
dissenting). This case provided the court with an easy target, as the liti-
gants were neither poor nor black, which characterize most victims of such
takings.
7. Ana Virginia Gomes & Mariana Mota Prado, Flawed Freedom of Association in
Brazil: How Unions Can Become an Obstacle to Meaningful Reforms in the Labor
Law System, 32 Comp. LAB. L. & PO'Y J. 843, 855 (2011).
8. See ROBERT 0. PAXTON, THE ANATOMY OF FASCIsM 186 (2004). Unlike
many criticisms of corporatism, however, this paper will attempt to show its
inherent flaws, rather than criticize based merely on its association with
fascism.
9. See id.
10. Alfred C. Aman, Jr., The Globalizing State: A Future-Oriented Perspective on the
Public/private Distinction, Federalism, and Democracy, 31 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L
L. 769, 795 (1998).
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goals." It argues that the goals of states, companies, and workers1 2
are closely aligned: corporations serve the goals of the state, and con-
sequently, the state should create conditions favorable for the corpo-
ration." "[A] more corporatist role for states [seems to] be emerging
as states try to do more than simply reflect the sum total of the prefer-
ences of their inhabitants, and instead seek to assert their view of the
public interest."14
B. Corporatism Critiqued
"First, corporatism denies the basic pluralist idea that policy
emerges from the free and voluntary interaction of multiple interest
groups."" "Corporatism ... seeks to limit the number of groups with
access to the state [ ] "16 because (in effect) it assumes that the govern-
ment can only bargain with selected, representative interest groups or
peak organizations," "with subsequent deal-making among those
groups with respect to public policy in key areas.""s Where pluralism
envisions an unlimited number of interest groups acting essentially as
so many atomistic actors creating a competitive political marketplace,
corporatist theory sees a limited number of groups, each wielding sub-
stantial political power.' 9 Groups are assembled into hierarchies, with
"peak associations" at the top holding the most influence with govern-
ment policymakers. These peak associations are groups like industry-
wide business associations or national labor federations, and the
broad membership of these groups is thought to discourage narrow
conceptions of political interest. Consequently, in corporatism, it is
11. Eric Engle, Europe Deciphered: Ideas, Institutions, and Laws, FLETCHER F.
WORLD Ave., Fall 2009, at 63.
12. These are the three groups that are referred to henceforth when discussing
the limited number of groups with access to policy decisions. Corporatism
sees these three groups as representative of the entire population in one
respect or another. Therefore it is more efficient and effective, according
to corporatism, to have these three major groups come together to resolve
issues of public concern than to require the cumbersome and inefficient
procedures of democratic rule.
13. "Likewise, corporatists believe the state should, in cooperation with corpo-
rations, create conditions favorable for workers. Thus, guaranties of medi-
cal care, retirement, unemployment insurance-the social insurance
systems established in the first world since about 1900-are provided be-
cause educated, healthy workers are more productive, enabling corpora-
tions to better serve the interests of the state." Id.
14. See Aman, The Globalizing State, supra note 10, at 795.
15. See Aman, Globalization, Democracy, and the Need for A New Administrative Law,
supra note 4.
16. See Wachter, supra note 2.
17. "Peak [organizations] are groups like industry-wide business associations or
national labor federations, and the broad membership of these groups is
thought to discourage narrow conceptions of political interest." Id.
18. See Aman, Globalization, Democracy, and the Need for A New Administrative Law,
supra note 4, at 1705.
19. See Wachter, supra note 2, at 591.
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not the local community organizations but national interest groups
that are expected to wield power and take part in public policy. 20
Second, during the bargaining that ensues, corporatist theory holds
that the state is operating with a public interest goal in mind. 2 1 It is
not a representative entity meant to effectuate the desires of its citi-
zens, but an independent, seemingly autonomous player with a very
important seat at the policymaking table. In so doing, the state does
more than simply reflect the sum total of the preferences of its constit-
uents, but rather seeks to assert its view of the public interest in the
bargaining that ensues.2 2 The state is, in a sense, just another actor
(though obviously a very powerful one)."
Third, as a result of these state approaches, corporatist theory holds
that the state is elitist in nature-democratic in neither purpose nor
result.24 The bargaining that the state engages in, from a corporatist
perspective, often represents an attempt by those molding public pol-
icy to avoid a confrontational mode of governance and to reach a
politics of accommodation. To achieve this degree of consensus, how-
ever, normal political processes usually are sidestepped. What often
substitutes for traditional democratic processes are technocratic and
managerial solutions. It is technocracy and various forms of expertise
that often provide the legitimacy for results that occur outside tradi-
tional democratic processes. Therefore, a corporatist approach is
not as democratic in its approach as other forms of interest group
behavior, which place democratic principles and procedures on a
rather high pedestal.2 6
Corporatism is "uniquely morally defective" in comparison with
other theories of political organization.2 7
Assignment of groups to different social places [based on
their role in society or their level of sophistication in admin-
istration or management] appears to be substantively wrong,
especially in light of the corporatist anatomy, which locates
powerful groups at or near the head, and weaker groups or
minorities at the subservient belly or feet.
20. See id.
21. See Aman, Globalization, Democracy, and the Need for A New Administrative Law,
supra note 4, at 1705.
22. See id.
23. See Aman, The Globalizing State, supra note 10, at 795.
24. See Aman, Globalization, Democracy, and the Need for A New Administrative Law,
supra note 4, at 1705.
25. Id.
26. See Aman, The Globalizing State, supra note 10, at 795.
27. Ronald R. Garet, Communality and Existence: The Rights of Groups, 56 S. CAL.
L. REV. 1001, 1041 (1983).
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... Corporatism is wrong because it systematically renders
groups unequal to one another.28
Despite the flaws of such a mode of governance, this has become
the norm in the manner in which property is redistributed from the
poor and working classes to corporations and private developers.
That norm developed and morphed over several decades of shifting
judicial treatment of government takings.
C. Judicial Abrogation of the Definition of "Public Use" Pre-Kelo
"Early American common law recognized eminent domain as a tak-
ing that served a 'public advantage,' for 'the necessities of the state,'
and for the 'public welfare.'" 2 "Following the adoption of the Consti-
tution, takings by eminent domain were not a source of substantial
dispute, as public uses were commonly recognized and accepted."so
"Colonial and early state constitutions at the dawn of American juris-
prudence made provisions for the use of eminent domain for the con-
struction of mill dams and private roads."" "As the industrialization
of America grew" during the middle of the nineteenth century "the
use of eminent domain began to expand" as land was taken and given
to privately-held railroads for tracks." While some cases prior to 1954
broadened the concept of public use" in the Fifth Amendment, there
was still reasonable limitation on its applicability.
"However, the Supreme Court's 1954 decision in Berman v. Parker,
upholding a Congressional determination to clear blighted slum areas
28. Id.
29. Paul W. Tschetter, Kelo v. New London: A Divided Court Affirms the Rational
Basis Standard of Review in Evaluating Local Determinations of "Public Use", 51
S.D. L. REv. 193, 209 (2006). A taking is any exercise of government power
that appropriates the real property of a private individual and brings it
under state control (i.e. public use). However, as will be subsequently dis-
cussed, takings can sometimes be used to effectuate the transfer of real
property from one private party to another for the development of real
estate or commercialization of communities.
30. Id. at 210. "Despite the recognition of the existence of eminent domain at
common law, the United States Constitution, as it was originally ratified,
did not provide protection to private property interests. Initially, the Con-
stitution made no reference of, nor did it create, the concept of eminent
domain. Private property protections were not established until James
Madison introduced the Bill of Rights in 1789." Id. at 209.
31. Id. at 210 (citations to other sources omitted).
32. Tschetter, supra note 29, at 210-11.
33. See Mt. Vernon-Woodberry Cotton Duck Co. v. Alabama Interstate Power
Co., 240 U.S. 30 (1916) (upholding the use of eminent domain by a public
utility); Rindge Co. v. Los Angeles County, 262 U.S. 700 (1923) (rejecting
the narrow construction of the public use doctrine); United States. ex. rel.
Tennessee Valley Authority v. Welch, 327 U.S. 546 (1946) (holding that an
agency-constructed dam which flooded the access road to the property of
six land owners was a legitimate public use).
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of Washington, 'D.C.,"3 " 'gave the [public use] limitation a mortal
blow . .. when it held that 'the concept of the public welfare is broad
and inclusive' enough to allow the use of the eminent domain power
to achieve any end otherwise within the authority of Congress.' ""
The Court "held, in effect, that it was within the power of the legisla-
tive branch . . . to take into account, in enacting redevelopment legis-
lation, aesthetic considerations as well as considerations of health.""
The Court's decision extended the reach of the "theory of the Public
Use Clause by stating that legislative decisions should control public
use determinations."3 7 The Court held that "[o]nce the object of the
legislation is legitimate, it justifies the means chosen to achieve it.""
The Court essentially said "the end justifies the means-a proposition
not usually heard in other areas of constitutional law.""
Thirty years after Berman, the Court was faced with another impor-
tant eminent domain case in Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkff4 0 At
issue was a Hawaii land reform statute that allowed a local commission
to select specific properties and permit the holders of long-term leases
on those properties to purchase the land from the owners in fee sim-
ple. 4 ' To reduce the perceived social and economic evils" of a land
oligopoly traceable to the early high chiefs of the Hawaiian Islands,
the Hawaii Legislature enacted the Land Reform Act of 1967 which
created a land condemnation scheme through which title in real
property was taken from lessors (i.e. aristocratic landowners) and
transferred to lessees in order to reduce the concentration of land
ownership.4" The Act allowed lessees living on single-family residen-
tial lots within tracts at least five acres in size to ask the Hawaii Hous-
ing Authority (HHA) to condemn the property on which they lived.
When appropriate applications by lessees were filed, the Act author-
ized HHA to hold a public hearing to determine whether the State's
taking of the given land would effectuate the purposes of the Act. If
34. Tschetter, supra note 29, at 218 (citations to other sources omitted); see also
Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954) (sustaining the comprehensive con-
demnation of blighted areas for public housing projects).
35. Tschetter, supra note 29, at 218 n.194 (quoting RICHARD EPSTEIN, TAKINGS:
PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN 161 (1985)).
36. 348 U.S. at 26.
37. Tschetter, supra note 29, at 218.
38. Gideon Kanner, The Public Use Clause: Constitutional Mandate or "Hortatory
Fluff'?, 33 PEPP. L. REv. 335, 353 (2006).
39. Id.
40. 467 U.S. 229 (1984).
41. See Tschetter, supra note 29, at 221.
42. The Act at issue here was in many respects an attempt to counter what had
been, up to that point, corporatist holdings in property, passed on from
generation to generation, to the detriment of those with little influence or
power. The inclusion of this case is not meant as a criticism of the holding
itself or the Act, but is rather a necessary component in the understanding
of the broadening and evolution of the Public Use clause.
43. 467 U.S. at 229.
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the HHA determined that these public purposes would be served, it
was authorized to designate some or all of the lots in the tract for
acquisition by the State. It then acquired, at prices set by a condemna-
tion trial or by negotiation between lessors and lessees, the former fee
owners' "right, title, and interest" in the land, and would then sell the
land titles to the applicant lessees.4 4
The Court reiterated the Berman decision by stating that questions
of public use should be deferred to legislative decision-making.4 5
"Concerning this deference to state lawmakers, when considering
what constitutes a public use, the Court [held that] the rational basis
test" is to be applied.46
D. Kelo v. City of New London: The Definitive Turn
While these cases broadened the public use requirement greatly, no
case has had as lasting an impact on Fifth Amendment jurisprudence
as Kelo v. City of New London.4 7 "[T] he underlying [development] plan
supporting the exercise of eminent domain ... was openly conceived
in tandem with, and designed to meet the specific needs of, a private
corporation, Pfizer Pharmaceutical."48
The pharmaceutical company Pfizer, Inc. announced that it would
build a $300 million research facility in the town, which had up to that
point had an ailing economy.49 Local planners hoped that Pfizer
would draw new business to the area, thereby serving as a catalyst to
the area's rejuvenation.o This case was "not [about] an indepen-
dently conceived and executed municipal redevelopment effort that
incidentally benefited Pfizer" after the fact, but was a jointly planned
project that was certain to inure to the substantial benefit of Pfizer."'
Without the involvement of Pfizer and its eventual success in the area,
the project concededly could not have worked as there would have
been no customers for the planned five-star hotel, or for the upscale
condominiums, or marina. The benefit to Pfizer was not incidental
but was rather integral to the plan causing the city to cater to the
corporation. Several of the property owners objected to the seizure
44. Id.
45. See id. at 244.
46. Tschetter, supra note 29, at 221.
47. 545 U.S. 469 (2005).
48. Audrey G. McFarlane, Rebuilding the Public-Private City: Regulatory Taking's
Anti-Subordination Insights for Eminent Domain and Redevelopment, 42 IND. L.
REv. 97, 104 (2009). In fact, the president of the New London Develop-
ment Corporation, who is largely credited with persuading Pfizer to put its
new research headquarters on a site adjacent to the redevelopment project,
was at the time married to Pfizer's director of research. See Kanner, supra
note 38, at 342.
49. 545 U.S. at 473.
50. Id.
51. Kanner, supra note 38, at 342.
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the government was attempting to effectuate, which led to the
litigation.' 2
In an opinion authored by Justice Stevens, the Court began its anal-
ysis by stating that the "sovereign may not take the property of A for
the sole purpose of transferring it to another private party B, even
though A is paid just compensation."" After acknowledging this,
however, the Court goes on to explain that economic development
has been seen as a legitimate public purpose" for some time. 5 Even
while momentarily putting aside the differing definitions of "use" and
"purpose," it would seem the Court was promoting contradictory legal
doctrine. The taking of privately-held land simply to be given to an-
other private individual is not legally permissible," unless, of course,
the party to receive the property will provide a certain amount of ben-
efit to the surrounding community." Just how much benefit, the
Court was unwilling to address," but it was willing to say that eco-
nomic development is a permissible public use (or is it purpose
now?)." "That is, seeking to attract or retain private companies is a
legitimate government function."60
As in Berman and Midkiff the Court restated its deferential treat-
ment to the legislative determination to take the land, for whatever
use was deemed worthy." Just as the Court declined to second-guess
the City's judgments about the efficacy of its development plan, it also
declined to second-guess the City's determinations as to what lands it
needed to acquire in order to effectuate its desired project.62 "It is
not for the courts to oversee the choice of the boundary line nor to sit
in review on the size of a particular project area," the Court said.6 3
The cases are legion in which courts choose to "second-guess" legisla-
tive determinations and analyze the constitutionality of prospective
government actions,6 but the Court does not seem to think forced
displacement of citizens warrants such judicial scrutiny so long as com-
pensation 65 is paid. This deferential standard adopted for the Public
Use Clause is, therefore, deeply perverse.66 It encourages "those citi-
52. See 545 U.S. at 475.
53. Id. at 477.
54. Emphasis added.
55. Id. at 484.
56. Id. at 478.
57. Id. at 487.
58. Id. at 483.
59. Id. at 484.
60. McFarlane, supra note 48, at 107.
61. 545 U.S. at 488-89.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 489 (quoting Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 35-36 (1954)).
64. So legion that any potential list of citations to such cases would be nonsensi-
cal. Searching any hornbook would suffice the reader in a query for an
example of such a judicial ruling.
65. Generally determined by the government actor.
66. See McFarlane, supra note 48, at 112.
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zens with disproportionate influence and power in the political pro-
cess, including large corporations and development firms" to victimize
the weak," a key feature and shortcoming of corporatist theory."
The Court surrendered even more of its power to decide whether the
proposed redevelopment constitutes a "public use" to the very munici-
pal agency seeking to condemn the properties in question for its own
fiscal benefit at the behest of a private, profit-seeking developer.
E. Post-Kelo Private Transfers
Subsequent to the Court's decision in Kelo, courts have given
greater deference to private transfers. Several subsequently-decided
cases give insight to the effect Kelo has had on Fifth Amendment juris-
prudence. In Western Seafood Co. v. United States, the owner of a shrimp
trawler servicing business, seeking an injunction to prevent condem-
nation of some of its riverfront property for the purpose of construct-
ing a marina to be operated privately, sued the City of Freeport,
Texas, and a private development corporation created by the city for
urban development purposes.o As in Kelo, the City sought to develop
its waterfront to revitalize a waning local economy." The Fifth Circuit
found that the proposed taking of Western Seafood's property was the
result of a carefully considered development plan.
Western Seafood argued that Kelo was distinguishable because in
the New London case the beneficiaries of the transfer of property
were not identified prior to the city's exercise of eminent domain.
Western Seafood maintained that in its own case, the beneficiaries
were identified prior to or at the earliest stages of the City's planning
process. 2 Relying on Justice Kennedy's concurrence in Kelo, Western
Seafood argued that these facts required a higher standard of scrutiny
than rational basis.7
67. Id. at 112-23.
68. See Aman, Globalization, Democracy, and the Need for A New Administrative Law,
supra note 4, at 1705.
69. Kanner, supra note 38 at 336.
70. W. Seafood Co. v. United States, 202 F. App'x 670 (5th Cir. 2006).
71. Id. at 675.
72. Id. at n.9 (explaining that "[f]irst, at the December 5, 2003 hearing for
preliminary injunction, the City's counsel stated, '[the Blaffers] were the
ones who came forward and said, Hey, we'd like to do this project for you.'
Second, at the April 8, 2004 status conference, Defendants' counsel replied
to the district court's inquiry regarding the participation of the developer
Royall by saying, 'Mr. Royall is the principal, the, I guess, person in charge.'
Third, Western Seafood cites to the master plan document dated October
2002 to demonstrate that the marina project had been proposed by the
Blaffers before the development plan was drafted. The document says,
'Building a state-of-the-art marina right on the riverfront as proposed by
the Intermedics property owners. . . .' Western Seafood points out that the
Blaffer heirs owned the Intermedics property.").
73. Id. at 675.
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The Fifth Circuit declined to address whether a heightened stan-
dard was necessary because it did not believe the facts warranted such
an analysis. The court acknowledged that the plaintiff offered evi-
dence to prove the private benefit in the case was intended, but the
court said that because the beneficiary's property was along the river
where the marina was to be built, the City's desire to collaborate with
them was logical. The court believed the evidence provided by West-
ern Seafood did not support the inference that the City exhibited fa-
voritism or had a purpose other than to promote economic
development in Freeport. 4
Another recent case is Goldstein v. Pataki, which stemmed from a
publicly-subsidized development project that included the construc-
tion of a sports arena that would be home to the National Basketball
Association franchise then known as the New Jersey Nets, 7 5 as well as
no fewer than sixteen high-rise apartment towers, and several office
towers.7 ' Fifteen property owners whose homes and businesses in the
takings area were slated for condemnation to make way for the project
brought suit to enjoin the eminent domain proceedings from taking
place. The plaintiffs alleged that the project, from its very inception,
was not driven by legitimate concern for the public benefit.77 Instead,
the property owners claimed that a "substantial" motivation of the va-
rious state and local government officials who approved or acquiesced
in the approval of the redevelopment project had been to benefit
Bruce Ratner, the man whose company first proposed it and who was
to serve as the primary developer. Ratner was also the principal owner
of the New Jersey Nets. In summation, the plaintiffs argued that all of
the "public uses" the defendants had advanced for the taking and sub-
sequent construction were pretexts for a private transfer that violated
the Fifth Amendment.
The Second Circuit stated that the development project met several
well-established categories of public uses, including the redress of
blight, the creation of affordable housing, the creation of a public
open space, and various mass-transit improvements.7 ' Although the
court acknowledged that the property owners who brought suit owned
property in the takings area that was not blighted, the court stated
that "community redevelopment programs need not, by force of the
Constitution, be on a piecemeal basis-lot by lot, building by build-
ing." Further, the court said it did not matter that New York had
74. Id.
75. Since the subsequent move into New York City, the team has been renamed
the Brooklyn Nets, in honor of the franchise's new hometown.
76. Goldstein v. Pataki, 516 F.3d 50, 53 (2d Cir. 2008).
77. Id. at 54.
78. Id. at 58-59.
79. Id. at 60 (quoting Rosenthal & Rosenthal Inc. v. New York State Urban Dev.
Corp., 771 F.2d 44, 46 (2d Cir. 1985) (quoting Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S.
35 (1954))).
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procured the services of a private developer to execute such improve-
ments and implement its development plan."o Upon finding a valid
public use to which the project is rationally related, it "makes no dif-
ference that the property will be transferred to private developers, for
the power of eminent domain is merely the means to the end.""
The Third Circuit decision in Whittaker v. County of Lawrence2 is also
informative. There, the property owners who brought suit all owned
parcels of property within an area of approximately 530 acres that had
been identified for industrial development by the Lawrence County
Economic Development Corporation, a private non-profit corpora-
tion formed by Lawrence County." When purchase negotiations
proved unsuccessful, the County created the Redevelopment Author-
ity of Lawrence County, which had the authority to condemn prop-
erty, which it quickly did.
The Third Circuit began its analysis by stating that a taking for pur-
poses of economic development satisfies the Fifth Amendment's pub-
lic use requirement. 84 The property owners asserted that the
Lawrence County Commissioners authorized the use of eminent do-
main power despite no indication of blight, as required by Penn-
sylvania's Urban Redevelopment Law, and that such deliberate misuse
of state authority suffices to violate the substantive due process guar-
antee of the Constitution. The court noted that a state official's fail-
ure to follow state law does not, by itself, shock the conscience" in the
absence of additional facts. Because the property owners simply al-
leged that the defendants did not follow state law in taking their prop-
erty without providing any other evidence of conduct that shocked the
conscience, the court dismissed the claim.
Lastly, arguing that the action in this case amounted to "intentional
and arbitrary discrimination" without a rational basis, the property
owners brought an equal protection claim.86 The property owners
claimed that because the property was not blighted, there was no legit-
imate government interest in exercising eminent domain over the
property and that the government officials acted irrationally in con-
demning it. The Third Circuit disagreed however, stating that States
have a legitimate government interest in exercising their eminent do-
main power for the public use, which, for purposes of the Federal
80. Id. at 59-60.
81. Id. at 60 (quoting Rosenthal, 771 F.2d at 46). The unanswered question is,
to what end; public use or private redevelopment and ownership?
82. Whittaker v. County of Lawrence, 437 F. App'x 105 (3d Cir. 2011).
83. Id. at 107.
84. Id. at 108.
85. "[A]n underlying constitutional violation is not required to state a substan-
tive due process claim, and some violations of state law may shock the con-
science," enough to violate the substantive due process guarantee. Id.
86. Id.
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Constitution, includes economic development. Any argument to the
contrary was, to the court, without merit."
III. Issue
These cases serve to show the corporatist nature of much of modern
Takings law; governments and private corporations collaborate to at-
tain a mutual desired social end, which is meant to benefit the com-
munity as a whole. However, as is so often the problem with
corporatism in practice, government bargains only with selected, rep-
resentative interest groups or peak organizations and normal political
processes are sidestepped for the sake of efficiency." What often
substitutes for traditional democratic processes are technocratic and
managerial solutions."
What is perhaps most upsetting about this state of affairs is that even
to the extent that the land-owners can prove favoritism in the selec-
tion of a particular development plan, those land-owners would have
redress only through state law, not federal constitutional law.9 o So
while municipal officers involved in corporatist back-dealing to attain
personal benefits might be subject to state legal sanction, the fact that
corporate favoritism occurred has no effect on the constitutional
claim. In other words, any self-serving corporatist dealings the
redeveloper and city might enter into would not make the "public
project" any less or more public.9 The inequities posed by these gov-
ernment-coerced private transfers require reviewing courts to apply a
more demanding standard as a safeguard.
IV. Analysis
A. Public-Private Redevelopment Has a Disparate Impact on Low-Income
and Minority Neighborhoods.
i. Decision-makers often exercise inadvertent discrimination in pur-
suit of economic development.
The corporatist nature of the aforementioned cases stems from the
public-private redevelopment that leads to the use of the eminent do-
main power by government actors at varying levels. While some find
these public-private partnerships to be beneficial for economic growth
87. Id.
88. See Aman, Globalization, Democracy, and the Need for A New Administrative Law,
supra note 4, at 1705.
89. Id.
90. Rosenthal & Rosenthal Inc. v. New York State Urban Dev. Corp., 605 F.
Supp. 612, 618 (S.D.N.Y. 1985), affd 771 F.2d 44 (2d Cir. 1985). The court
actually evaded the condemnees' argument. They argued not only that
there was favoritism in choosing the redeveloper, but also that the project
boundaries were corruptly drawn to encompass their property for the fa-
vored redevelopers' use. Id. at 616-17.
91. See Kanner, supra note 38, at 363.
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and city morale," the problems posed by redevelopment programs
would seem to outweigh any claimed economic benefit to the already-
affluent by providing them with housing, shopping, and
entertainment.
The first problem is the rather unbecoming history of redevelop-
ment and urban renewal projects in the twentieth century. Redevel-
opment has had a long and inglorious history of open racism and
abuse of those on the lower rungs of the socio-economic ladder."
The underprivileged, poor, and lower middle-class "who are forcibly
displaced by urban renewal without compensation for all their de-
monstrable economic losses,"94 are the same people who are sup-
posed to be the beneficiaries of "benign government housing policy,
but whose vital interests in a family home are in fact ignored."95 That,
to say the least, is an unfortunate display of moral blindness on the
part of advocates of redevelopment." The history of redevelopment
is notorious because society's needs are contested and subjective,
often colored by narrow perspectives, racism and classism." Redevel-
opment projects consistently come at the expense of the same
marginalized groups, namely Black communities, the poor, the work-
ing class, and more recently, middle-class residents." Advocates for
social justice in the 1960s recognized the elitist and racist purposes to
which many federal urban renewal funds were dedicated, giving urban
renewal the nickname, "Negro Removal."" The ruling in Kelo is con-
ducive to municipal favoritism and corruption, and may raise the re-
newed danger of illegitimate use of urban renewal in a racially
discriminatory fashion to remove minority populations from coveted
parts of town, potentially reinvigorating this "Negro Removal" of the
1950s.100
Specific examples of such discrimination abound. Of the many
families forcefully displaced by urban renewal between 1949 and 1963,
" '63 percent of those whose race was known were nonwhite," and
further, "of these families, 56 percent of nonwhites and 38 percent of
whites had incomes low enough to qualify for public housing, which
. . . was seldom available to them' " to begin with."o' Public works
projects in the 1950's and 1960's destroyed predominantly minority
92. See Marc B. Mihaly, Public-Private Redevelopment Partnerships and the Supreme
Court: Kelo v. City of New London, in THE SUPREME COURT AND TAKINGS:
FOUR EssAYs 41 (Vermont Law School 2006).
93. See Kanner, supra note 38, at 348.
94. Id. at 348-49.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 349.
97. McFarlane, supra note 48, at 117.
98. Id. at 99.
99. See Mihaly, supra note 92, at 41.
100. Kanner, supra note 38, at 338.
101. 545 U.S. at 522 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (quoting Berman v. Parker, 348
U.S. 26, 28 (1954)).
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communities in St. Paul, Minnesota, and Baltimore, Maryland. 10 2 In
1981, urban planners in Detroit, Michigan, uprooted the largely
lower-income and elderly Poletown neighborhood for the benefit of
the General Motors Corporation. os More than 97 percent of those
"forcibly removed from their homes by the 'slum-clearance' project
upheld . . . in Berman were black."104
The perceived need was to improve dilapidated, economically dis-
connected neighborhoods which have historically been located in
poor or working-class, black communities in the inner city.1o' As
demonstrated by the community disruption resulting from poorly
conceived and poorly executed redevelopment schemes during the
urban renewal era, the oppression of the "blight" designation has
been an enduring feature of American urban life. Kelo has now geo-
graphically detached eminent domain from inner cities and has made
it apparent that the power could potentially be exercised anywhere.
By clarifying that "economic development" now theoretically permits
property and communities to be taken and remade anywhere, the op-
pressive aspects of the broad term "development" are finally receiving
long overdue attention.
Not enough attention has been paid to how these changes impact
the urban social fabric by creating consistent winners and losers cho-
sen by a select few who dictate policy.' The consumptive needs and
excessive tastes of the affluent are prioritized in modern redevelop-
ment, while the rejection of older, less-upscale, land uses has become
personal, class-based, and subjective.'
ii. Unclear Definitions of what Constitutes a Blighted Neighborhood
Enable Community Groups to Maneuver Decision-making to their
Favor while Minimizing Input from Affected Groups.
The sometimes-ambiguous notion of blight in eminent domain pro-
ceedings permits questionable determinations. Given this trouble in
determining what blight is, the ease of accepting blight elimination as
a basis for exercising eminent domain is, in effect, a way of saying
"take someone else's property, not mine."' Is society prepared to say
that "living in a blighted neighborhood mean [s] one's property is . . .
less important to the owners who consider that blighted place home"
than if they lived in modern suburbia?o' And what of the effects of
declaring these slum properties as blight? The situation is not im-
102. Id.
103. J. WYLIE, POLETOWN: COMMUNITY BETRAYED 58 (1989).
104. 545 U.S. at 522 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (quoting Berman, 348 U.S. at 30).
105. See McFarlane, supra note 48, at 100.
106. Id. at 117.
107. Id.
108. "[O]ne person's blight is another person's community." Id. at 129.
109. Id.
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proved when slum property is converted into public housing, which
has financial and other eligibility restrictions imposed on those whom
the redevelopment sought to aid.110 Far from there being an effort to
ensure an even distribution of the social surplus, the financial eligibil-
ity requirements are now meant to prevent universal access at a non-
discriminatory price. The projects only retain the title "public"
because the government has chosen to help operate them, not be-
cause they truly benefit the public. When viewed on their faces, these
programs are dependent on the taking of private property for future
private use."'
In an attempt to gain support in these disenfranchised communi-
ties, Community Benefit Agreements (CBAs) were introduced in the
1990s as a popular instrument in helping to negotiate benefits for the
communities directly affected by a development.1 12 Covering a lot of
issues and having a lot of groups sign on is what gives CBAs credibility
as having addressed the most important issues to each particular com-
munity. However, these public-relation efforts seem to have provided
little change. In 2010, a task force led by the New York City comptrol-
ler studied CBAs in New York and noted that agreements of this
type-signed when building the new Yankee Stadium, a retail com-
plex in the Bronx and Columbia University's Manhattanville expan-
sions-were negotiated in a context where no clear and generally
accepted standards existed to allow critics of the projects to question
their credibility. The majority of the task force came to the conclu-
sion that in New York City, CBAs have been overtaken and usurped by
developers and by pro-development advocates. From the developer's
point of view, this provides a good tactic for minimizing opposition
and opening the way for minor concessions to the surrounding com-
munity in order to garner support.1 1 3
B. Quantitative Evidence of Failures of Corporatist Takings
In addition to the substantive concerns over the negative effects
that these corporatist programs have on marginalized societal groups,
the incremental, quantifiable benefits of economic development are
over-touted as real.1 14 The results of government financial support
and eminent domain proceedings are rarely scrutinized and grand
promises for jobs are rarely enforced." A suitable example comes
from the Atlantic Yards project that was the basis of the suit in Gold-
stein v. Pataki, discussed above. There, jobs haven't appeared in the
110. See EPSTEIN, supra note 35, at 179.
111. Id.
112. Dan Rosenblum, Selling Low, Building High, NEXT CIrY (Feb. 18, 2013),
http://nextcity.org/forefront/view/selling-low-building-high.
113. Id.
114. See McFarlane, supra note 48, at 106.
115. Id.
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numbers promised by officials who, when selling the project at first,
predicted nearly 17,000 construction jobs and 8,000 permanent
jobs."' In 2009, the Empire State Development Corporation, a state
authority charged with managing the project, predicted 4,538 new
jobs in the city as a result of the redevelopment project. Despite these
predictions, during the work, the average workforce at the site ranged
from 841 to 880, which the developer reported in late July. According
to the developer's figures, when the average was 880 construction
jobs, 256 were Brooklyn residents and less than 10 percent were from
the four community boards in the area. There are around 2,000 of
the more permanent arena jobs, but only an estimated 105 are full
time. Additionally, at least 20 percent of the subsidized housing units
in B2 are reserved for families making more than $100,000, despite
the claim of affordable housing. Spaces that were meant to be and
were claimed to be reserved for working-class families will instead go
to wealthier New Yorkers." 7
Recent studies suggest that there is no association between eco-
nomic development incentives and any measure of economic per-
formance."18  No statistically significant associations between
economic development incentives per capita and average wages or in-
comes; between incentives and college graduates or knowledge work-
ers; or between incentives and the state unemployment rate have been
found." 9
These findings are consistent with the broad body of research on
incentives. 2 o A detailed 2002 study of more than 350 companies that
received development incentives found these incentives actually had a
negative effect on these companies' ability to create jobs.'2 1 Using
detailed statistical models to control for a wide variety of factors, this
study discovered that companies that received incentives expanded
more slowly than those that did not and also that the overall effect of
incentives was a reduction of 10.5 jobs per establishment. 1 2 2
Further, the use of eminent domain for economic development
seems to be very unpopular with the general population. A poll con-
ducted by Quinnipiac University showed that people are overwhelm-
116. See Rosenblum, supra note 112.
117. Id.
118. Richard Florida, The Uselessness of Economic Development Incentives, THE AT-
IANnIc (Dec. 7, 2012), http://www.theatlanticcities.com/jobs-and-econ-
omy/2012/12/uselessness-economic-development-incentives/4081/.
119. Id. (With the help of the MPI's Charlotta Mellander, the author examined
to what degree economic development incentives are related to state eco-
nomic performance. "Mellander ran correlations between economic devel-
opment incentives per capita and economic variables like wages, income,
poverty levels, education levels, knowledge workers, and so on.")
120. Id.
121. Todd Gabe & David Kraybill, The Effect of State Economic Development Incen-
tives on Employment Growth of Establishments, 42 J. REG'L Sci.703,703 (2002).
122. Id. at 723.
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ingly opposed to the use of eminent domain for economic
redevelopment with 89 percent opposing and only 8 percent approv-
ing.1 23 Those conducting the poll said that they had never seen such
a lopsided margin on any issue they had polled. "Similarly, a poll con-
ducted by the University of New Hampshire found that 93 percent of
those polled opposed using eminent domain for private
development."124
As with corporatism of any kind, the vital concern is the lack of
democratic process in policy and decision-making.12 1 "Powerlessness
in the face of change is part of the human condition, but legal doctri-
nal powerlessness in the face of human-initiated change is profoundly
different," particularly when the one initiating the change is also the
one precluding harmed parties from redress. 126 This is no longer a
regulatory world in which government exercises a reactive, police-
power role and the private developer plays the protagonist.'2 7 In-
stead, this is a contractual world, where the traditional roles of each
are broken apart and rearranged. Those who are democratically
elected defer much of the redevelopment determinations to private
unaccountable actors.128 Such deference to groups wielding eco-
nomic and political clout pervades of corporatism.
C. Heightened Review
Given the aforementioned negative effects takings of this kind have
on poor, working class, and minority communities, it would seem ap-
propnate to require a more exacting judicial review than the rational
basis test. Several commentators 29 had proposed a heightened stan-
dard of scrutiny for takings that transfer property from one private
party to another prior to Kelo. However, the dissents of Justice
O'Connor and Justice Thomas in that case have received the most
123. See Kanner, supra note 38, at 345.
124. Id.
125. See Aman, Globalization, Democracy, and the Need for A New Administrative Law,
supra note 4, at 1705.
126. See McFarlane, supra note 48, at 98.
127. See Mihaly, supra note 92, at 41.
128. See id.
129. See, e.g., David L. Callies, Public Use: What Should Replace the Rational Basis
Test?, 19-APR PROB. & PROP. 14, 15-16 (2005); Nicole Stelle Garnett, The
Public-Use Question as a Takings Problem, 71 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 934 (2003);
Joseph J. Lazzarotti, Public Use or Public Abuse, 68 UMKC L. REv. 49, 68-75
(1999); Thomas Ross, Transferring Land to Private Entities by the Power of Emi-
nent Domain, 51 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 355, 369-81 (1983); Stephen J. Jones,
Comment, Trumping Eminent Domain Law: An Argument for Strict Scrutiny
Analysis Under the Public Use Requirement of the Fifth Amendment, 50 SYRACUSE
L. REv. 285, 304-14 (2000); PeterJ. Kulick, Note, Rolling the Dice: Determining
Public Use in Order to Effectuate a "Public-Private Taking" -A Proposal to Redefine
"Public Use," 2000 L. REv. MICH. ST. U.-DET. C. L. 639, 672-88; Laura Man-
snerus, Note, Public Use, Private Use, and Judicial Review in Eminent Domain,
58 N.Y.U. L. REv. 409, 424-56 (1983).
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attention and will act as blue-prints for a proposed test to the dilem-
mas posed by corporatist takings. By emphasizing the city's perspec-
tive, the majority opinion was able to consider the dire economic
conditions in New London separate from the specific interests that
residents of the redevelopment area might have had.so The two dis-
sents, however, looked at the prospective redevelopment from the
eyes of the landowners because they believe that their obligation, as
guardians of the Constitutional rights of the property owner, is to ask
and answer what this all meant for the condemnees.13 1
Justice O'Connor strongly critiqued the majority's holding that inci-
dental public benefits of economic development qualify as a valid
"public use.""S2 The majority held that the state has the power to take
property "currently put to ordinary private use, and give it over for
new, ordinary private use, so long as the new use is predicted to gener-
ate some secondary benefit for the public-such as increased tax reve-
nue, more jobs, maybe even esthetic pleasure."13 3 However, Justice
O'Connor correctly pointed out that any lawful use of real private
property can be said to generate some incidental benefit to the pub-
lic. Therefore, if positive side effects are enough to render transfer
from one private party to another constitutional, then the "public use"
clause places no genuine limitation on government and transfers
from one private party to another are perfectly constitutional so long
as the acquiring party can show its capacity to increase economic out-
put on the land. 3 4
Further compounding the legal analysis is the fact that private bene-
fit and incidental public benefit are, by definition, merged and mutu-
ally reinforcing.'13  That is precisely the problem with economic
development takings. In this case, for example, any boon for Pfizer or
the plan's developer is difficult to disaggregate from the promised
public gains in taxes and jobs. The majority's logic states "that emi-
nent domain may only be used to upgrade-not downgrade-prop-
erty."' 36 In essence, such a holding "makes the Public Use Clause [of
the Fifth Amendment] redundant with the Due Process Clause, which
already prohibits irrational government action." The Court then iron-
ically acknowledges itself that it is not the place of judges to do rela-
tive cost-benefit analysis for every challenged taking to determine
whether there will be an increase in economic output. This claimed
constraint is thus of no genuine importance, however, for as Justice
O'Connor asks, "who among us can say she already makes the most
130. See McFarlane, supra note 48, at 105.
131. See Mihaly, supra note 92, at 41.
132. Kelo v. City of New London, Conn., 545 U.S. 469, 494 (2005) (O'Connor,
J., dissenting).
133. Id. at 501.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 502.
136. Id. at 503.
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productive or attractive possible use of her property?" The possibility
of condemnation now hangs over all property as no constitutional
limit prevents the State from "replacing any Motel 6 with a
Ritz-Carlton, any home with a shopping mall, or any farm with a fac-
tory." Thus, economic development takings jeopardize the security of
all private property ownership.13 7
The enduring contribution for heightened judicial review of such
takings from Justice O'Connor's dissent is that "incidental public ben-
efit" cannot act as a valid "public use" for constitutional analysis.1 38
Were this to be the case, the notion of public use would be nothing
more than excess language devoid of meaning as almost any property
(particularly residential property) can be put to more economically
efficient use. 3 9
Taking this insight from Justice O'Connor's dissent, it is proper to
now move to that of Justice Thomas. Making similar observations to
those of Justice O'Connor, Justice Thomas noted that if "the Public
Use Clause served no function other than to state that the govern-
ment may take property through its eminent domain power-for pub-
lic or private uses-then it would be surplusage."o4 0 He also notes
that the Takings clause is a prohibition on government rather than a
power granted to it,141 and that it seems most implausible that the
Framers intended to defer to state and local legislatures as to what
satisfies the Public Use Clause, uniquely among all the express provi-
sions of the Bill of Rights.'4 2
However, most significant for the present analysis was his observa-
tion and call for heightened scrutiny for takings of this sort:
Allowing the government to take property solely for public
purposes is bad enough, but extending the concept of public
purpose to encompass any economically beneficial goal guar-
antees that these losses will fall disproportionately on poor
communities. Those communities are not only systematically
less likely to put their lands to the highest and best social use,
but are also the least politically powerful. If ever there were
justification for intrusive judicial review of constitutional pro-
visions that protect "discrete and insular minorities," . . .
surely that principle would apply with great force to the pow-
137. Id. at 505 (citing Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit, 304
N.W.2d 455, 465 (Mich. 1981), overruled by County of Wayne v. Hathcock,
684 N.W.2d 765 (Mich. 2004)).
138. Id. at 501.
139. Id..
140. Id. at 507 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
141. Id. at 511.
142. See id. at 517-18.
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erless groups and individuals the Public Use Clause
protects.' 4 3
This observation sums up well the need for heightened scrutiny be-
cause, most often, takings of this sort disproportionately harm those
with the least access to the political process. As with any corporatist
government action, those groups excluded from policy decisions are
harmed most for the sake of efficiency or elitist public policy.
In addition to the substantive benefit of heightened scrutiny, such a
test would lessen the need to litigate cases of this kind. A demanding
standard such as this would make it difficult for private transfers to
pass muster for legislatures to attempt them. Further, many of those
cases which might nonetheless be brought would be easily disposed of
in the dismissal or summary judgment stage. A standard of this level is
not only in the interest of those with less access to policy decisions, but
also in the interest of judicial economy.
It seems most appropriate that takings be necessary to further a
compelling government interest. Public use and access to facilities
and routes of transportation would most certainly pass this test, but
increased economic output would not. If the aforementioned dan-
gers of corporatism in economic development takings are to be
guarded against, the Constitution can allow nothing less.
V. Conclusion
Eminent Domain, when used in its proper capacity serves the legiti-
mate interest of promoting communal cohesion and effective routes
of transportation for the general populace. Unfortunately, the public
use requirement of the Fifth Amendment's taking clause has been re-
placed by a requirement of economic development. This has led to
the abuses enumerated above, including, but not limited to the use of
the eminent domain power of the state to transfer property from one
private party to another.
These acts are distinctly corporatist in that they are decided upon
and executed outside of the proper political process with few parties
at the bargaining table.14 4 Only those parties wielding the most politi-
cal, economic, or financial clout have the ability to make determina-
tions of what uses land will go to, even if the desired land is not yet
owned by any party involved in the negotiations. Veiled behind the
vague term, economic development, cities and municipalities are now
143. Id. at 521-22 (citing United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144,
152 n.4 (1938)).
144. Proper political process does not include unelected corporate managers or
board members. Their voices are to be heard in the same manner and
same way as their fellow-citizens; through the electoral process. Instead,
these private actors have the ability to mold policy by allocating funds from
one municipality (or municipal officer) to another as means of growing
and increasing revenue.
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including non-state actors in the policy decisions underlying much of
the acts of the locality in question.
This back-room process works to the detriment of certain groups
consistently, including the poor, working class, and black community.
Areas that appeal to the affluent, but do not yet meet their tastes are
repossessed and renovated under the auspices of urban renewal. This
urban renewal is not much more than those same exclusive bargain-
ing parties negotiating their way to cheap purchase and redevelop-
ment of urban spaces for the benefit of themselves and their cohorts.
This presents the dilemma of corporatism in practice: inequality of
opportunity and inequality of outcome.
Such disproportionate harm to specific classes of citizens warrants
no less than the most exacting judicial scrutiny. Approaches such as
this are often shouted down as too enamored with property rights or
too ideological. Property rights are most important for the least-well
off amongst us, as they protect from the reaching arm of both govern-
ment and business. Judicial attention should be most focused on pro-
tecting those rights for the poor and working classes rather than
redistributing it to the well-connected in the hope of increased tax
revenue or economic development and expansion. If property rights
and equality are to have any significant meaning in Constitutional law,
all should be secure in their holdings, not only those who have the
ability to dictate policy. The Constitution is meant as a safeguard
against such government actions, but has instead become a tool for
outright theft from the poor to the rich. The notion that such state
action is good public policy befits the tyrant more than the free.
I am unable to accede to this statement of law. If correct, the
property of the poor is held by uncertain tenure, and the
constitutional provisions forbidding the taking of property
for private use would be of no avail. As a substitute it would
be declared that private property is held on condition that it
may be taken by any person who can make more profitable
use of it, provided that such person shall be answerable in
damage to the former owner for his injury... Public policy, I
think, is more concerned in the protection of individual
rights than in the profits to inure to individuals by the inva-
sion of those rights.14 5
145. McCleary v. Highland Boy Gold Mining Co., 140 Fed. 951, 952 (C.C.D.
Utah 1904).
